econ.studio
Exchange Economies
Exercises

Exchange Economies

Exercises

Work through the prompts first, then compare against the solutions once you are ready.

Exercise 1
Walrasian Equilibrium Computation Two agents A and B have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences ui(x1,x2)=x10.5x20.5u_i(x_1, x_2) = x_1^{0.5} x_2^{0.5}. Endowments are ωA=(4,1)\omega_A = (4, 1) and ωB=(1,4)\omega_B = (1, 4).
  1. (a)
    Find the Walrasian equilibrium price ratio p1/p2p_1/p_2, using the closed-form formula with p2=1p_2 = 1 as numeraire.
  2. (b)
    Given the equilibrium p1p_1, compute each agent's wealth mi=p1ωi1+ωi2m_i = p_1 \omega_{i1} + \omega_{i2} and derive the equilibrium allocation (xA,xB)(x_A^*, x_B^*).
  3. (c)
    Compare each agent's utility at the equilibrium allocation with utility at the endowment. Are both agents better off?
Exercise 2
Asymmetric Preferences Agent A has uA=x10.7x20.3u_A = x_1^{0.7} x_2^{0.3} and agent B has uB=x10.3x20.7u_B = x_1^{0.3} x_2^{0.7}. Endowments are ωA=(5,5)\omega_A = (5, 5) and ωB=(5,5)\omega_B = (5, 5), so total endowments are Ω1=Ω2=10\Omega_1 = \Omega_2 = 10.
  1. (a)
    Find the Walrasian equilibrium price ratio p1/p2p_1/p_2.
  2. (b)
    Compute each agent's equilibrium allocation (xA,xB)(x_A^*, x_B^*).
  3. (c)
    Which agent is a net buyer of good 1 and which is a net seller? Relate this to their preferences.
Exercise 3
Contract Curve Derivation Agents A and B have Cobb-Douglas preferences uA=x1αAx21αAu_A = x_1^{\alpha_A} x_2^{1-\alpha_A} and uB=x1αBx21αBu_B = x_1^{\alpha_B} x_2^{1-\alpha_B}. Total endowments are Ω1\Omega_1 and Ω2\Omega_2. Derive the contract curve xA2(xA1)x_{A2}(x_{A1}) from first principles.
  1. (a)
    Write down the MRS for each agent in terms of their own consumption bundle. Recall MRS=u/x1÷u/x2MRS = -\partial u / \partial x_1 \div \partial u / \partial x_2.
  2. (b)
    Set MRSA=MRSBMRS_A = MRS_B and substitute the box constraints xB1=Ω1xA1x_{B1} = \Omega_1 - x_{A1} and xB2=Ω2xA2x_{B2} = \Omega_2 - x_{A2}. Solve for xA2x_{A2} as a function of xA1x_{A1}.
  3. (c)
    What is the contract curve when αA=αB\alpha_A = \alpha_B? Describe it geometrically.
Exercise 4
Second Welfare Theorem Both agents have αA=αB=0.5\alpha_A = \alpha_B = 0.5 and total endowments Ω1=Ω2=10\Omega_1 = \Omega_2 = 10. A social planner wants to implement the allocation xA=(8,8)x_A = (8, 8), xB=(2,2)x_B = (2, 2).
  1. (a)
    Verify that the target allocation (xA,xB)=((8,8),(2,2))(x_A, x_B) = ((8,8),(2,2)) lies on the contract curve.
  2. (b)
    Find the equilibrium price ratio p1/p2p_1/p_2 consistent with this allocation being a Walrasian equilibrium (from the MRS condition at the allocation).
  3. (c)
    Describe a lump-sum redistribution of initial endowments such that the Walrasian equilibrium from those new endowments implements (xA,xB)=((8,8),(2,2))(x_A, x_B) = ((8,8),(2,2)).