econ.studio
Exchange Economies
Section 2 of 12
Section 2

Endowments, Allocations, Feasibility

Primitives

An exchange economy has a finite set of agents I={1,,n}I = \{1, \ldots, n\}, a finite set of goods L={1,,}L = \{1, \ldots, \ell\}, preferences for each agent over consumption bundles in R+L\mathbb{R}^L_+, and an initial endowment that specifies how much of each good each agent starts with. No production technology appears anywhere in the model. The total supply of every good is therefore fixed at the sum of individual endowments.

Endowment
Agent ii's endowment is the vector ωi=(ω1i,ω2i)R+2\omega^i = (\omega^i_1, \omega^i_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2_+ specifying the quantity of good 1 and good 2 they bring to the market. The aggregate endowment is Ω=iωi\Omega_\ell = \sum_i \omega^i_\ell for each good \ell.
Allocation
An allocation x=(xA,xB)x = (x^A, x^B) assigns a consumption bundle xi=(x1i,x2i)R+2x^i = (x^i_1, x^i_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2_+ to each agent. An allocation specifies what each agent ends up consuming after all trade has taken place, not what they start with.
Feasible allocation
An allocation is feasible if total consumption does not exceed total endowment in every market: x1A+x1Bω1A+ω1Bx^A_1 + x^B_1 \le \omega^A_1 + \omega^B_1 and x2A+x2Bω2A+ω2Bx^A_2 + x^B_2 \le \omega^A_2 + \omega^B_2. An allocation that holds both inequalities with equality is non-wasteful; one that leaves slack in any market wastes goods that could have been consumed.

Two consumers, two goods

The rest of this module works in the canonical I=2I = 2, L=2L = 2 case: two agents — call them AA and BB — trading two goods. This is the smallest economy in which there is any trade to study. Everything that follows generalises to I>2I > 2 agents and L>2L > 2 goods, but the generalisation loses the Edgeworth box diagram and replaces it with higher-dimensional geometry. The two-by-two case retains the picture, and the picture carries almost all the intuition.

The Edgeworth box

The Edgeworth box is a single rectangle that displays every non-wasteful feasible allocation at once. Its width is Ω1=ω1A+ω1B\Omega_1 = \omega^A_1 + \omega^B_1 — the total endowment of good 1 — and its height is Ω2=ω2A+ω2B\Omega_2 = \omega^A_2 + \omega^B_2. Every point strictly inside the box (and on its boundary) is exactly one non-wasteful allocation. There are no leftovers: whatever AA does not consume, BB consumes.

The construction uses two origins. Agent AA's consumption bundle (x1A,x2A)(x^A_1, x^A_2) is measured from the lower-left corner, moving rightward for more of good 1 and upward for more of good 2. Agent BB's bundle (x1B,x2B)(x^B_1, x^B_2) is measured from the upper-right corner, moving leftward for more of good 1 and downward for more of good 2. Because the box dimensions equal the total endowments, the two readings always sum to the totals: x1A+x1B=Ω1x^A_1 + x^B_1 = \Omega_1 and x2A+x2B=Ω2x^A_2 + x^B_2 = \Omega_2.

The initial endowment point ω=(ωA,ωB)\omega = (\omega^A, \omega^B) is one particular point inside the box — the allocation the economy starts at before any trade occurs. It is no more or less feasible than any other interior point. Its special status comes from outside the feasibility criterion: it is the fallback each agent can guarantee themselves by refusing to trade, which matters for individual rationality and for the boundary conditions of the Walrasian budget set.

The box below is live. Adjust the endowment controls and watch the rectangle resize: its width tracks Ω1=ω1A+ω1B\Omega_1 = \omega^A_1 + \omega^B_1 and its height tracks Ω2=ω2A+ω2B\Omega_2 = \omega^A_2 + \omega^B_2. The dot is the endowment ω\omega, measured as AA's bundle from the lower-left origin OAO_A; the same point read from the upper-right origin OBO_B is BB's bundle. There are no preferences or prices here yet — every point in the box is simply a non-wasteful feasible allocation.

The Edgeworth box

Properties an allocation might have

Feasibility
Total consumption of each good fits within the total endowment: xA+xBΩx^A_\ell + x^B_\ell \le \Omega_\ell for every good \ell. Every point in the Edgeworth box satisfies this with equality; points outside the box violate it.
Individual rationality
Each agent weakly prefers their assigned bundle to their endowment: ui(xi)ui(ωi)u^i(x^i) \ge u^i(\omega^i) for every agent ii. An individually rational allocation leaves no agent worse off than they would be by simply refusing to participate in trade.
Pareto efficiency
No reallocation exists that makes at least one agent strictly better off without making any other agent strictly worse off. Pareto efficiency is a weak welfare criterion — it says nothing about distribution — but it is a necessary condition for any allocation to be normatively defensible. The set of Pareto efficient allocations inside the box is the contract curve, developed in the next section.